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The recent remake of the television series Battlestar Galactica pres-ents us with something like a proof-of-concept for contemporary
posthumanist thought and criticism. In it, a handful of surviving
civilians and soldiers are called upon to deal with beings that have
apparently tried to enact genocide upon the “human race.” Somewhat inconveniently,
these machines have inexplicably turned on their makers and look, feel, and act just
like human beings. Some of them even appear to have a conscience and to be capable
of love. No matter. Once it is determined that one of these “skin jobs” is actually a
“toaster,” it (she?) is treated accordingly: torture, rape, and summary execution. Yet
again, the proof of our humanity comes in the form of a presumed licence to enact
forms of inhuman cruelty upon others. Humanity is thus defined by its essential in-
humanity. As the song that resonates in the walls of the Galactica herself says, “There
must be some kind of way out of here.”
Sheryl Hamilton’s excellent and timely book Impersonation: Troubling the Person
in Law and Culture suggests a way out of here, a way that begins by critically unravelling
the normative and legal category of the person, a category in which the various conceits
and contradictions of humanism come home to roost. As Hamilton points out, collec-
tively we have made a “deep investment in the notion of the person,” as one of the
“fictions by which we order our social relations.” Her book seeks to take this category
of the person, this fiction, and “worry its easy claims … poke at its complacency …
challenge its naturalization” (p. 7). From the outset, the category of personality is
coded as social, cultural, and historical, in a manner that exceeds the essentialism that
stills haunts most discussions conducted using the language of the human, including
those posthumanist conversations ostensibly aimed at disrupting this essentialism
and the binaries it engenders. As a fiction, the person is social all the way down.
The book commences by outlining a set of premises that frame the troublesome
category of the person: that even as it appears stabilized in ethical and legal systems,
the status of personality remains perennially contested; that this instability is particu-
larly pronounced and exposed in relation to liminal beings who inhabit the uneasy
and blurry margins of personhood; that personality does not precede, but rather is
produced by, a range of technologies, techniques, and discourses that together com-
prise the “socially-sanctioned mechanisms to ascribe mark and verify personhood”
(p. 8); that while legalization and juridification are crucial processes by which various
technologies of personification are combined, ordered, and rendered authoritative in
particular settings, they accomplish this only imperfectly and in lieu of the actual di-
versity and complexity of locations and practices in which personhood is continually
in play; and, finally, that narrative is the most productive modality for thinking and
talking about personhood.
These premises suggest both the scope of Hamilton’s inquiry and its method. The
core of the book comprises a series of five stories about the troubled and troublesome
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personification of liminal beings, beings that are not “naturally” understood as persons
until they are made so by some combination of cultural and legal techniques. The first
is the story of the corporation as a person at law, a legal fiction into whose moral status
Hamilton inquires by way of a series of questions about the rights and responsibilities
attributed to these persons not only in law but also in political and cultural discourse.
The second retells the story of the notorious Persons Case, in which the “Famous Five”
successfully challenged provisions of the British North America Act, 1867 whereby
women were denied eligibility for appointment to the Canadian Senate on the grounds
that they were not persons. Here, rather than simply rehearsing the legal arguments
at issue in the case, Hamilton examines subsequent contests over the meaning of the
case and its protagonists in Canadian material and popular culture as a way of demon-
strating how personhood remains a deeply gendered attribution even after its gender-
neutrality has apparently been fixed in law. 
Third is the story of how invented life-forms, in this case clones, trouble the cate-
gory of personhood by challenging two of the key distinctions upon which that status
is purportedly based: the distinction between human beings and property, and be-
tween human beings and animals. The analysis combines close attention to the legal
career of the notorious Harvard Mouse with cultural readings of recent renderings of
the personality of invented life forms as presented in recent science fiction films. Next,
Hamilton unpacks the potential personality of computers, in the form of thinking ma-
chines ranging from IBM’s game-playing Deep Blue to the various software bots that
now act on our, and sometimes their own, behalf in digital networks. Here, the ques-
tion of personhood is raised as a quality of the mind, in particular the capacities for
reason, performance, and deception, capacities that are increasingly delegated to ma-
chines that can pass for, or impersonate, us in various settings, but which we are nev-
ertheless anxious about personifying. The book’s final story is that of the celebrity, a
type of abstract person whose commodity form—that of the persona—moves through
the circuits and cycles of consumption and entertainment as a property only tenuously
connected to the person that ostensibly grounds it.
In each of these stories, Hamilton’s aim is to demonstrate the trouble with persons,
personality, and impersonation by highlighting complex and sometimes contradictory
subplots that run below or alongside the dominant legal narratives through which
these stories (crucially, not “cases”) and the questions they raise are typically presented.
What makes this approach so successful is that Hamilton’s nuanced readings of the
complex and controversial culture of personality, and its stakes, never come at the ex-
pense of a thoroughgoing and expert rendering of the legal and jurisprudential tech-
nicalities her treatment nevertheless seeks to exceed and augment. Hamilton walks
the walk when it comes to both legal and cultural studies and, quite aside from the
thought-provoking insights that appear consistently throughout the text, the book
represents a model for the sort of high-calibre scholarship that becomes possible when
an author takes the wager of interdisciplinarity seriously.
The book’s primary theoretical contribution is Hamilton’s development of the
concept of the persona as a necessary cultural adjunct to overly juridical discourses of
the person. If personhood is a status bestowed or occupied by objects, then persona is
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the “lived articulation of that person” as performed in the context of cultures that co-
construct the meaning of that performance. Hamilton’s stories teach us that juridical
discourses of the person cannot tell us much about the stakes of personality absent a
simultaneous and equivalent reckoning with narratives of persona, a reckoning that
arguably exceeds the juridical in its complexity, if only because such performances are
enacted and circulate across the multiplicity of shifting registers. Hamilton’s implicit
counsel is that we resist the temptation to objectify the person and instead treat per-
sonality as the emerging and relational thing that it really is. As she puts it, “Personality,
rather than an outcome, is revealed as a process, as something we do, rather than
something we are” (p. 221). The weary humans on Galactica ask whether their captives
are human and, certain that they are not, act accordingly. Perhaps they would have
done better to ask what sort of persons the Cylons in their custody might be, and what
sort of persons they themselves were becoming in casting them out of the airlock.
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